

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PEKING 02080 102113Z

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

-----077436 102124Z /62

P 100717Z JUL 78

FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1303

C O N F I D E N T I A L PEKING 2080

NODIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y- DOWNGRADING INST SGDS-1 VICE GDS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: OREP CH US

SUBJ: CODEL WOLFF MEETING WITH TENG HSIAO-PING

1. SUMMARY. TENG HSIAO-PING TOLD CODEL WOLFF JULY 9 THAT ALTHOUGH CHINA WOULD NEVER MAKE A COMMITMENT NOT TO USE FORCE TO RECOVER TAIWAN, PEKING WOULD "RESPECT REALITIES" AND WOULD DO ITS BEST TO "CREATE CONDITIONS TO SOLVE THIS QUESTION BY PEACEFUL MEANS." TENG CHARACTERIZED AS "VERY POSITIVE" RECENT REPORTS THAT THE US WOULDNOT SELL PLANES TO TAIWAN, ARGUING THAT SUCH SALES WOULD BLOCK THE CHANCES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE REFERRED TO COOPERATION WITH THE KMT IN THE 20'S AND 30'S AS A POSSIBLE MODE FOR FUTURE SETTLEMENT OF TAIWAN. END SUMMARY.

2. IN A 90-MINUTE MEETING WITH CODEL WOLFF JULY 9, VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING GAVE AN IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE. HE STATED THAT WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN, "THE ONLY OBSTACLE BETWEEN US", THERE COULD BE "NO CONCESSION" FROM THE PRC SINCE "THIS INVOLVES OUR OWN SOVEREIGNTY." ALTHOUGH "SOME PEOPLE HOPE THAT CHINA WILL UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT NOT TO USE FORCE,"
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PEKING 02080 102113Z

"WE CANNOT COMMIT OURSELVES ON THIS QUESTION". SUCH A COMMITMENT, HE SAID, WOULD OBSTRUCT A SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING A SOLUTION BY PEACEFUL MEANS. HE REPEATED THE STATEMENT THAT "WHEN AND HOW WE LIBERATE TAIWAN IS OUR INTERNAL AFFAIR AND NO OTHER COUNTRY CAN POKE ITS NOSE INTO IT".

3. IN SPITE OF THIS REPETITION OF THE WELL KKNOWN PRC POSITION, TENG INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD AMERICAN SENSITIVITIES AND GAVE AN UNUSUALLY POSITIVE APPRAISAL OF THE CHANCES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF TAIWAN. HE STATED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS "NO ROOM FOR FLEXIBILITY" ON MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, "AS FOR THE SPECIFIC MODALITIES WE CAN CONSULT EACH OTHER." HE STATED THAT CHINA WOULD "RESPECT REALITIES AND WE CAN BE FLEXIBLE IN THE MEANS OF SETTLEMENT", AND THAT "I AM SURE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A SETTLEMENT SATISFACTORY TO ALL". EVEN MORE POSITIVELY, HE DECLARED THAT "WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO CREATE CONDITIONS TO SOLVE THIS QUESTION BY PEACEFUL MEANS," THE MOST FORTHCOMING FORMULA THAT I HAVE YET HEARD USED WITH A VISITING AMERICAN DELEGATION.

4. TENG ALSO REFERRED TWICE TO PRE-1949 COOPERATION BETWEEN THE KMT AND THE COMMUNISTS, AND ASKED: "SINCE THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN COOPERATION TWICE WITH THE KUOMINTANG, CAN YOU RULE IT OUT THE THIRD TIME?" ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE PRESENTLY ANY CONTACTS WITH TAIWAN, HE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE, BUT STATED THAT "WE KNOW A LOT OF PEOPLE THERE" AND THAT "CHIANG CHING-KUO WAS MY CLASSMATE."

5. ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT ANTI-COMMUNIST
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PEKING 02080 102113Z

FORCES ON TAIWAN MIGHT TURN TO THE SOVIETS, TENG ADMITTED THAT THEY HAD CONSIDERED THIS QUESTION, BUT FELT THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY BECAUSE OF THE MT'S HISTORICAL ANTI-SOVIET POSITION. EVEN IF IT HAPPENED, HE SAID, THE CHINESE COULD COPE, BECAUSE "I DON'T THINK THE US WOULD OPPOSE" THE USE OF FORCE IN SUCH A SITUATION.

6. TENG CHARACTERIZED AS "VERY POSITIVE" NEWS REPORTS THAT THE US WOULD NOT SELL PLANES TO TAIWAN AS ORIGINALLY RUMORED AND STATED THAT SUCH WEAPONS SALES WOULD "OBSTRUCT REUNIFICATION NEGOTIATIONS AND SETTLEMENT BY PEACEFUL MEANS," ADDING THAT "IF PEACEFUL MEANS ARE IMPOSSIBLE

THEN ARMED FORCE WILL HAVE TO BE USED." HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, STATE THAT SUCH SALES WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH NORMALIZATION.

7. AFTER RHETORICALLY ASKING WHETHER THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAS BEING MORE ACTIVE ON NORMALIZATION, TENG SAID THAT THE CHINESE WOULD WELCOME MORE ACTIVE US EFFORTS, ADDING THAT WHAT WILL ACTUALLY HAPPEN "DEPENDS ON THE EFFORTS OF BOTH

SIDES." HE EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT "WE AS WELL
AS YOU WILL HAVE A MORE ACTIVE ATTITUDE
TOWARD SETTling THE QUESTION OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS,"
NOTING THAT "WE HAVE THIS DESIRE AND WE HOPE YOU CAN
BE QUICKER.". HE CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING
APPRECIATION FOR THE EFFORTS OF AMERICAN
POLITICIANS TO ADVANCE NORMALIZATION, BUT SAID "WE HOPE
YOU CAN DO MORE." HE ALSO HOPED "THAT YOUR PRESIDENT
WILL TAKE MORE RESOLUTE ACTION THAN NIXON DID."
THIS , COUPLED WITH THE LACK OF ANY REFERENCE TO
CHINESE PATIENCE OR THE POSSIBILITY OF WAITING 20
OR MORE YEARS, SUGGESTS THAT THE CHINESE HAVE A
GREATER EXPECTATION OF MOVEMENT ON NORMALIZATION THAN
WAS VISIBLE A FEW MONTHS AGO.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 PEKING 02080 102113Z

8. TENG TOOK PAINS TO RELATE NORMALIZATION TO STRATEGIC
QUESTIONS, STATING THAT NORMALIZATION WOULD FORCE THE
SOVIET UNION TO ACT MORE CAUTIOUSLY. HE ALSO VOLUN-
TEERED THAT MOSCOW WAS TRYING TO BLUFF THE UNITED
STATES INTO BELIEVING IN THE POSSIBILITY OF SINO-
SOVIET RECONCILIATION, BUT THAT THIS WAS JUST A TRICK.
IN THE RELATIVELY BRIEF DISCUSSION ON INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, TENG ALSO EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN
ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS
THE "CUBA OF THE EAST" AND A TOOL IN MOSCOW'S
EFFORTS TO SUBVERT ASEAN. WHILE TENG HIMSELF DID
NOT DRAW AN EXPLICIT CONNECTION, SOME DELEGATION
MEMBERS REMARKED AFTERWARDS THAT THEY FELT PEKING'S
CONCERN WITH VIETNAMESE DEVELOPMENTS COULD BE
CREATING A MORE URGENT INTEREST AMONG CHINESE IN
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE US.

9. TRANSCRIPT OF CONVERSATION BEING SENT SEPTTEL.
WOODCOCK

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: VISIT, POLITICAL LEADER, TEXT, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MEETING REPORTS, MEETINGS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978PEKING02080
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P840150-2610, P840150-2606
Format: TEL
From: PEKING
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780779/aaaaconr.tel
Line Count: 156
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: fa726078-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2065751
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CODEL WOLFF MEETING WITH TENG HSIAO-PING
TAGS: OREP, PEPR, MASS, CH, US, (TENG HSIAO PING), (WOLFF, LESTER)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/fa726078-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014